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 1 Introduction
This paper is about a dilemma in welfare economics that should, perhaps,
be better recognised. Recently Fleurbaey and Tungodden (2010) showed
that there is an apparent con￿ ict between welfare criteria that are designed
to avoid di⁄erent types of ￿tyranny￿in social choice. One type of tyranny
is where social choices can be driven entirely by weight of numbers, irre-
spective of the interests of some specially disadvantaged member of society;
the other type of tyranny is where social choices are driven entirely by the
interests of one person, albeit a very needy person. The apparent con￿ ict
can be resolved, but the resolution may involve a further con￿ ict with other
fundamental welfare principles that are almost always taken as given in
conventional welfare economics. The word ￿may￿is important here because
whether there is really a con￿ ict or not depends on the precise formulation
of the issues and the precise context in which the problem is considered: in
particular this is a case where the size of the population under consideration
really matters.
It would be interesting to know whether the underlying issue is more
than just a theoretical curiosity by investigating the way people view the
problem of choice between distributions. Is there evidence of a dilemma?
Do they lean in the direction of one type of ￿tyranny￿or the other? Are
they concerned about the ￿standard￿welfare principles that are taken for
granted in conventional welfare economics? We pursue these questions using
a specially designed questionnaire study of opinions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines some of the theory
and explains the nature of the dilemma that lies at the heart of this paper.
Sections 3 and 4 set out our approach to an empirical investigation of the
problem and the main results. Section 5 examines the role of respondents￿
background in accounting for the pattern of answers to the questionnaire
study. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
Consider the following four welfare principles that appear to be intuitively
reasonable.
￿ Avoiding mob tyranny. Such a tyranny ￿also known as the ￿tyranny
of aggregation￿￿means a situation where weight of numbers can be
decisive in social-welfare judgments even in cases where the (many)
gainers gain very little and the (few) losers lose a lot.
1￿ Avoiding individual tyranny. This tyranny ￿also known as the ￿tyranny
of non-aggregation￿￿means a situation where the well-being of one
person is decisive even in cases where there are many other persons in
society.
￿ Respect for progressive transfers. In its strict form this means that a
transfer from a poorer to a richer member of society produces a welfare
decrease; in its weaker form it requires that such a transfer should not
increase welfare. (Dalton 1920, Pigou 1912).
￿ Irrelevance of replication. Social-welfare comparisons of income distri-
butions are una⁄ected by ￿scaling up￿the population.
It is clear that many commonly used welfare criteria are consistent with
some, but not all, of these principles. We can show this using a couple of
examples in an n-person society. Let the utility of person i be given by ui (a
real number), i = 1;2;:::;n, label the persons such that u1 ￿ u2 ￿ ::: ￿ un
and write social welfare in this society as W (u) where u := (u1;u2;:::;un).
De￿ne u(") as the vector derived from u by subtracting an amount " from
the component i = ifrom and adding " to component i = ito; the change
u ! u(") represents a transfer of " from one individual (ifrom) to another
(ito). Also de￿ne u[m] as the mn-dimensional vector derived from u by
replicating it m ￿ 1 times; this is the formal representation of ￿scaling up￿
the population.





where ￿ is an increasing function.
￿ Suppose person j loses an amount ￿ of utility and everyone else gains






where ￿0 denotes the ￿rst derivative of ￿. Person j￿ s utility loss is not
decisive though, because if the gain to the others is large enough then
(2) could turn out positive rather than negative ￿there is no individual
tyranny.
2￿ Furthermore, it is well known that, if ￿ is concave, then
W (u) ￿ W (u(")) if " > 0 and ifrom < ito (3)
with strict inequality if ￿ is strictly concave so that (1) respects the
principle of progressive transfers.
￿ Clearly also W (u[m]) = mW (u) so that, for any two n-vectors u and
u0:
W (u) ￿ W
￿
u0￿





which means that (1) satis￿es irrelevance of replication.
￿ So the last three of the above four ￿intuitively reasonable￿ principles
are satis￿ed. But the remaining principle is not satis￿ed. Suppose the
distribution u is such that
u1 < u2 = u3 = ::: = un (5)
and imagine a situation where poor person 1 loses ￿ while everyone
else gains ￿; expression (2) now becomes
￿￿0 (u1)￿ + [n ￿ 1]￿0 (u2)￿ (6)
Even though ￿0 is strictly decreasing and even if ￿ is a big number
while ￿ is small, (6) could turn out positive if n were large enough.
This is exactly the phenomenon of mob tyranny.
Example 2 Suppose instead the social-welfare function has the ￿maxi-min￿
form
W (u) = u1: (7)
Again three out of the four principles hold for W as de￿ned in (7). First,
(3) holds, with strict inequality if ifrom = 1. Also W (u[m]) = W (u) so that
(4) trivially holds. Furthermore, because W respects only the utility of the
poorest person, the welfare change expressions corresponding to (2) and (6)
equal ￿￿; there is no mob tyranny (it does not matter how large n is) but
there is individual tyranny (it does not matter how large ￿ is).
But, from just these two examples, a worrying question arises. Together
the functions W given in (1) and (7) cover a very large proportion of com-
monly used welfare criteria; so is it the case that we always have to put up
with one or other tyranny in a social-welfare function?
3The short answer to this question is ￿no,￿but the longer answer to it is
particularly interesting.1 The problem is essentially to do with the implied
weighting of individuals in the computation of social welfare. Clearly the
social-welfare functions in the two examples are special cases of
W (u) = ￿1￿(u1) + ￿2￿(u2) + ::: + ￿n￿(un); (8)
where the ￿i are a set of ￿positional weights￿ : (1) assigns an equal weight
to everyone, whatever their position in the income distribution; by contrast
(7) assigns a positive weight to the poorest (￿1 > 0) and zero weight to
everyone else. But, perhaps one might be able to resolve the problem of the
two tyrannies by introducing a set of weights ￿i that is strictly decreasing
in i, from poorest to richest. This can indeed be done, as in the following
example; but the example also illustrates a further problem that arises in
cases where both tyrannies are avoided.





where ￿ < 1.
￿ If person j loses an amount ￿ of utility and everyone else gains ￿ then






Person j￿ s utility loss is not decisive because, if ￿ is not too large, the
evaluation of the gains of the other n ￿ 1 people may be su¢ ciently
large to cause (10) to be positive. Individual tyranny is avoided in the
case of this social-welfare function.
1Avoiding individual tyranny requires a principle such as minimal aggregation: for
every person there is some small utility loss that can be taken as acceptable if all the
other members of society have a large enough utility gain. Likewise, avoiding mob tyranny
requires a principle such as minimal non-aggregation: if a worst-o⁄ person is su¢ ciently
badly-o⁄ and gains enough, there is a small loss that is tolerable for all the best-o⁄
people, no matter how many of these better of people there are. These aggregation and
non-aggregation principles are fully discussed in Fleurbaey and Tungodden (2010) and
Fleurbaey et al. (2009).





and it is clear that, if ￿ is su¢ ciently large, then (11) could be negative,
no matter how large n is: the large single loss outweighs the gains of
the many. Mob tyranny is also avoided.
￿ The social-welfare function in (9) also respects the principle of pro-
gressive transfers. To see this note that W (u) ￿ W (u(")) is propor-
tional to "[1 ￿ ￿r] where r := ifrom ￿ ito; given " > 0, ￿ < 1 and
ito > ifrom it is clear that once again W (u) > W (u(")).
￿ However the fourth principle ￿irrelevance of replication ￿is violated
by the social-welfare function in (9).2. Let u be given by (5) and again








= (u1 ￿ ￿;u2 + ￿;u3 + ￿;:::;un + ￿): (12)
Then W (u0) ￿ W (u) is given by (11). Now replicate the two vectors,
so that there are 2 poor people who each lose ￿ and 2n ￿ 2 rich people
who each gain ￿. The change in social welfare W (u0 [2]) ￿ W (u[2])
is given by




If ￿;￿;￿;n are such that
￿2 ￿ ￿2n







then expression (11) is positive while expression (13) is negative. Hence
it is possible to have both W (u0) > W (u) and W (u0 [2]) < W (u[2]):
Two further observations. First it is clear that as n increases indef-
initely, the bounds appearing in (14) move apart, as their di⁄erence equals
(1 ￿ ￿n)(￿ ￿ ￿n)=
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
: so the larger the population, the easier the con-
ditions for violating the replication principle. Second it is possible to ￿nd a
social-welfare criterion that avoids both individual tyranny and mob tyranny
2See also CapØau and Ooghe (2007).
5and that satis￿es the population-replication principle, but this would then
violate the principle of progressive transfers.3
In sum, it is possible to ￿nd a criterion for social choice that avoids
either form of tyranny, but in doing so one may violate other fundamental
principles such as the respect for progressive transfers and the irrelevance of
replication. We can only be sure of reconciling three out of the four intuitive
principles that we mentioned in the introduction to this section.
The theoretical formulation of the problem, however, requires that the
population size is unbounded. When the population size is bounded, the
problem takes a milder form. Suppose for instance that the population
cannot exceed ten individuals. Then the risk of mob tyranny when u1 <
u2 = u3 = ::: = un is easily avoided with the social welfare function (1) by
making ￿ su¢ ciently concave ￿that is, by adopting a su¢ cient aversion to
inequality ￿so as to make
￿￿0 (u1)￿ + 9￿0 (u2)￿ < 0:
When n reaches astronomical magnitudes, a much stronger aversion to in-
equality is needed to guarantee that
￿￿0 (u1)￿ + [n ￿ 1]￿0 (u2)￿ < 0:
The problem is that this inequality not only means that individual 1 losing ￿
while all the others gain ￿ is considered undesirable, but also that individual
1 losing ￿=(n ￿ 1) while individual 2 alone gains ￿ is also rejected. When
n is very large, this implies individual tyranny.
The tension between avoiding mob tyranny and avoiding individual tyr-
anny therefore depends on the possible size of the population and on the
degree of inequality aversion that one is willing to adopt, or, in other words,
on how afraid of individual tyranny one is. The greater the inequality aver-
sion (the less one is afraid of individual tyranny), the greater the size of the
population that is needed to make mob tyranny occur. One may therefore
ask if, with the typical degree of inequality aversion that one encounters in
the population, the population size that is needed to reveal the tension is
realistic or astronomical. In the latter case, the problem can be considered
mostly theoretical. In the former case, decision-makers and practitioners
should seriously worry about it.
3This is shown in Fleurbaey and Tungodden (2010) who use as an example the case
where one makes the choice between u and u







n) where intu means the smallest integer
greater than or equal to u:
63 The approach
Is the problem outlined in section 2 anything more than a neat theoret-
ical conundrum? To establish whether the two tyrannies pose a dilemma in
practice we used the established technique of elicitation by means of ques-
tionnaire.4 The questionnaire combines verbal and numerical questions, con-
tains questions in both closed and open form, and allows for respondents￿
comments.
3.1 Questionnaire summary
The main part of the questionnaire consists of four scenarios, each of which
concentrates on one speci￿c principle. The questionnaire itself is reproduced
in the Appendix; here is a sketch of the content and the structure of possible
responses:
Scenario 1 (Mob tyranny) Suppose one poor person bene￿ts from an
income increase of £G while all the rich,5 no matter how many there
are, su⁄er an income reduction of £1. If G were large enough would
this be a good idea?
￿ A Agree
￿then specify the threshold value of G
￿ B Disagree
Scenario 2 (Individual tyranny) Suppose one poor person su⁄ers from
an income cut of £1 while M rich people bene￿t from an increase of
£100. If M were large enough would this be a good idea?
￿ A Agree
￿then specify the threshold value of M
￿ B Disagree
Scenario 3 (Principle of progressive transfers) Suppose a small amount
of income " is transferred from a rich person to a much poorer person.
Would this be a good idea?
4The method is set out in detail in Amiel and Cowell (1999). See also Gaertner and
Schwettmann (2007) and the references therein for a recent application focusing on equity
judgments that give priority to the worst-o⁄.




Scenario 4 (Replication) Suppose n1 people with income y1 experience
an income increase of ￿ and n2 people with income y2 experience an
income decrease of ￿ and that this change in income distribution is
considered a good idea. Would it also be a good idea if the numbers
n1 and n2 were replaced by mn1 and mn2?
￿ A Agree
￿ B Disagree
On each scenario the respondents were invited to provide comments to
elucidate their answers if they wished to do so. The order in which scenarios
1 and 2 were presented was reversed in about half of the questionnaires.
There then follow some questions on personal characteristics and back-
ground; details on these are to be found in the discussion of the results in
section 5.
3.2 Sample
The questionnaire was run on a sample of 642 student respondents in three
groups. Two groups consisted of ￿rst-year and second-year students from
the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (labelled
NHH1 and NHH2 in the tables below); the third group was from the London
School of Economics and consisted of second-year undergraduates taking a
mathematically oriented microeconomics course.
The questionnaire was carried out under supervision during class time;
respondents were informed that the questionnaire was anonymous and were
requested not to interact with each other when ￿lling in their responses.
3.3 Responses
We begin with an impression of the type of distributional judgments made
by those in our sample, based on an overview of the pattern of responses.
The principal responses to the ￿rst two scenarios ￿on the two tyrannies
￿can be classi￿ed according to four types as in Table 1 where the interpret-
ation is as follows:
￿ The ￿anti-anti￿ respondents (in the AA category) are against both
individual tyranny and mob tyranny. Indeed the comments provided
8Scenario 2
A B
Scenario A Anti-Anti Maximin
1 B Aggregative Pro-Pro
Table 1: Types of response
by these respondents reveal their concern that the interests of the poor
person be protected6 but also concern that small changes for the poor
do not dominate the wider interests of society.7
￿ The AB category consists of those whose responses are consistent
with the ￿maxi-min￿principle (7); these respondents are against mob
tyranny.
￿ The BA category consists of those whose responses are consistent with
the aggregative approach implicit in welfare principles such as (1);
these respondents are against individual tyranny.
￿ BB-type responses might be given by libertarians or by those who were
confused about the underlying issues.
The proportions of respondents of each type for the three subsamples
are given in Table 2. Although there is a relatively lower proportion of LSE
respondents in category AB and a relatively higher proportion in category
BB, the di⁄erences between the subsamples are not great. Adding the pro-
portions in columns AA and AB we can see that a majority rejects mob
tyranny in scenario 1; however, adding the proportions in columns AA and
BA we can also see that a majority rejects individual tyranny in scenario 2!
6￿The person su⁄ering a £ 1 loss is already well o⁄, so won￿ t be a⁄ected much, but
gains for the poorer one will increase life standard signi￿cantly.￿￿Any increase in income
for the person with £ 10,000 would be a good thing in my opinion, however it would need
an extra £ 10,000 to bring their living standard to decent.￿￿£ 1 is a small proportion of
£ 50,000. This would not reduce living standards signi￿cantly, £ 10,000 would help the
single person to have decent living standards.￿￿The ones who earn £ 50,000 have enough
money, and even the slightest increase of the ones who earn £ 10,000 is for the good.￿￿The
marginal utility for each pound is larger for a person with low income than for a person
with a high income. £ 1 reduction out of £ 50,000 doesn￿ t change so much for the person
with a high living standard.￿
7￿If 100 people get an increase in income of £ 100, it equals £ 10,000. A reduction of £ 1
is not that heavy a loss, from my view.￿￿£ 1 is little, and if the £ 100 the rich ones gain
can contribute to work places and a better economy, it is worth it.￿
9N Type AA Type AB Type BA Type BB
LSE 118 33.1% 23.7% 17.8% 25.4%
NHH1 225 33.3% 30.7% 20.0% 16.0%
NHH2 299 32.8% 30.4% 18.1% 18.7%
All 642 33.0% 29.3% 18.7% 19.0%
Table 2: Distribution of Responses to Scenarios 1 and 2 by type
The responses to scenarios 3 and 4 are summarised in Table 3 which
shows the proportion of persons who responded A on scenario 3 (respect for
progressive transfers) and the proportion who responded A on scenario 4
(irrelevance of replication).8 It is clear that there is not much di⁄erence in
the pattern of responses across the di⁄erent subsamples: about 50% respond
in accordance with the principle of progressive transfers;9 the proportion of
the NHH2 sample that consider replication to be irrelevant is lower (21%)
than for either of the other two subsamples (around 31%).10 The proportion
of the samples (about 40%) that reject both principles may seem surprisingly
high. However, the comments of the respondents in this category reveal
that this heterodox position was often based on some careful reasoning;
the B response on scenario 3 was justi￿ed on the grounds of fairness,11 the
intrinsic rights of individuals12, speculation about other background issues
not speci￿ed in the scenario13 or wider issues of e¢ ciency;14 the B response
8Of the 642 persons in total 9 did not respond to Scenario 3 and 25 did not respond
to Scenario 4.
9Sum the ￿Progressive Transfers and Replication￿ and ￿Progressive Transfers only￿
columns to see this
10Sum the ￿Progressive Transfers and Replication￿and ￿Replication only￿columns to
see this
11￿It is not fair for the person with £ 50,000￿[and many similar comments]. ￿I don￿ t
think one person should have reduced income to increase another persons income if he
doesn￿ t wish this himself.￿￿The tax system does more than this already￿ .
12￿There is a reason why some persons have an income of £ 50,000 so they should be
able to keep it for themselves.￿￿One￿ s income should correspond to his contribution.￿
13￿Depends of level of experience, educational background, skills, if reduction is fairly
high the person that is used to the well-o⁄ lifestyle may get troubles with his economics.￿
￿Depends on how an individual has earned his income.￿￿It depends on their situation,
health, family, etc.￿
14￿There will be no incentives to better if everyone is equal without a reason.￿￿Simply
a redistribution of income: not the creation of wealth. Removes the incentives to earn
£ 50K.￿￿If you end up giving it away i.e. you can be subsistence, not work hard and get
by well enough.￿￿A redistribution of income can harm economy if the low income person
is not as skilled at investing as the high income person.￿
10on scenario 4 was justi￿ed on the basis of concern for absolute numbers of the
poor.15 However these heterodox arguments do not provide a ￿solution:￿
even within a framework respecting all these concerns, the basic puzzle would
remain.
N Progressive Transfers Progressive Transfers Replication neither
and Replication only only
LSE 118 18.6% 28.8% 11.9% 40.7%
NHH1 225 19.6% 28.0% 12.0% 40.4%
NHH2 299 11.7% 39.5% 9.7% 39.1%
All 642 15.7% 33.5% 10.9% 39.9%
Table 3: Distribution of Responses to Scenarios 3 and 4
We return to the numerical responses in section 4.2 below.
4 A dilemma?
4.1 Critical population size
The ethical principles underlying the scenarios are incompatible if the pos-
sible population is large enough. To see this consider the following argument
in four steps.
1. Suppose there is a population of size M + 1 containing 1 poor person
(in the questionnaire this means with income below £10,000) and M
rich people (with income above £50,000). Response A in Scenario 2
indicates that it would be acceptable to tax £1 from the poor person
to give an amount ￿ (where ￿ = $100) to each of the M rich people.
So the reverse, where the rich lose £￿ and the poor person gains £1,
would be unacceptable.
2. Now replicate m￿1 times to give a population of size n = m[M + 1].
Response A in Scenario 1 implies that it is acceptable to give G to one
clone of the poor person and tax £1 from each of the rich people.
3. Equalize among all clones of the poor so that each of them gains G=m.
This would be considered acceptable by respect for Progressive Trans-
fers.
15￿This may result in more people becoming poorer...￿
114. Now repeat this operation ￿ ￿ 1 times so that overall the rich lose
£￿ and the poor gain ￿G=m. Steps 2 and 3 above suggest that this
should be acceptable; but if
￿G=m ￿ 1 (15)
step 1 above suggests that it must be unacceptable!
Clearly, for the contradiction in step 4 to occur, the replication factor m
must be large enough for given ￿;G for (15) to hold: speci￿cally we need
m ￿ ￿G; this requires that the population size must satisfy n ￿ n￿ where
n￿ := ￿G[M + 1]: (16)
In our questionnaire study ￿ is ￿xed (at £100) but G and M are reported
by the respondents who select A in scenarios 1 and 2. So the respondents
e⁄ectively announce the critical value of n￿. The question we are interested
in is whether, according to the respondents￿views, the clash is severe (a low
n￿) or weak (incompatibility only for astronomical populations).
4.2 A problem in practice?
We know that a large proportion ￿about a third ￿of our respondents fall
into the ￿Anti-Anti￿category ￿see table 2. For some of these the dilemma
may prove to be a real practical problem16 Rigorously speaking, the dilemma
concerns only the respondents who endorse all four principles by answering
A in all four scenarios: at NHH, there are 33 such students (7% of a total
of 467); at LSE, there are 10 such students (8.5% of a total of 118). As
we discussed in section 2 this implies a logical contradiction for very large
populations. But we decided to focus on the larger subsample of the ￿Anti-
Anti￿category, because those who reject either progressive transfers or the
irrelevance of replication do not necessarily have consistent views. Indeed,
it would be possible to accommodate some of their concerns in our scenarios
(such as respecting individual rights) and obtain a dilemma again. Moreover,
there are versions of the dilemma that do not involve progressive transfers
or replication invariance.
16There is a subcategory of the ￿Anti-Anti￿group who, in the light of the argument of
Sections 2 and 4.1, can be characterised as having incoherent preferences. These are the
respondents who endorse all four principles by answering A in all four scenarios: at NHH,
there are 33 such students (7% of a total of 467); at LSE, there are 10 such students (8.5%
of a total of 118). As we discussed in section 2 this involves a logical contradiction for
very large populations.
12In order to investigate whether the dilemma is a practical problem, we
need to look at how the AA types responded in the follow-up numerical
questions on scenarios 1 and 2. Recall that question 2 on scenario 1 asked
the respondent to report a value of G, given that answer A had already been
selected on question 1; question 2 on scenario 2 asked for a value of M, given
that answer A had already been selected on question 1. A lower value of G
or a higher value of M are two di⁄erent aspects of ethical values that give
priority to the poor.
Table 4 presents a summary of the responses17 and Figures 1 and 2
show the marginal distributions of the reported values of G and M. Table
4 reveals substantial heterogeneity of response across the subsamples. In
particular, from the lower half of Table 4 we observe that the mean value of
reported M for LSE is substantially greater than that for either of the NHH
groups. We might expect G and M to be negatively correlated, so that both
indicators of priority to the poor are in the same direction, so to speak; this
is true for the NHH1 subsample, but not for LSE or NHH2.
Figure 1 shows that the distribution of the reported value of G is clearly
bimodal; so too (from Figure 2) is the distribution of the reported value
of M, where the mode at M = 1 is particularly pronounced. Two other
things immediately stand out: this pattern is consistent across the three
subsamples; in every case the median is much less than the mean (see also
the ￿rst two parts of Table 4).18
The lower mode in Figures 1 and 2 is striking: in the case of scenario 2
almost a quarter of the respondents say that if just one rich person bene-
￿ts from £100 this is worth cutting the poor person￿ s income by £1. The
presence of this mode might be interpreted in two ways: it could be taken
as a left-censoring of the distribution of responses; or we can see a spike at
the value 1 acting as a focal point for responses whose views are essentially
￿this is a good idea, whatever the numbers￿ . The latter interpretation is
clearly consistent with the comments of the AA-types who responded with
the value £1 in scenario 1.19 This interpretation is also consistent with each
17Invalid responses ￿such as speci￿ying a range of values rather than a single number ￿
have been excluded. In each of Figures 1 to 3 the labelling of the horizontal axis gives the
upper bound of each bin into which the observations have been sorted. So, for example,
in Figure 1 the label £ 1,000 is for the bin containing all the observations from £ 101 to
£ 1000.
18Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution just for AA types ￿those who responded ￿A￿
in both the ￿rst two scenarios. However if we plot the distributions of all responses to
Scenario 1 question 2 and all responses to Scenario 2 question 2 we obtain the same shapes.
19￿Any increase in income will be good for a person.￿ ￿The amount is not relevant,
seeing as those with high income lose little.￿￿The ones who earn £ 50,000 have enough
13Median Mean Std. Dev. Max Obs Corr (G;M)
G
LSE 1,000 6,533.73 12,420.93 50,000 30 0.1881
NHH1 1,000 2,705.90 5,408.53 40,000 69 -0.0729
NHH2 1,000 2,870.40 4,034.79 20,000 87 0.2376
All 1,000 3,400.24 6,663.96 50,000 186 0.1898
M
LSE 500 177,494.30 375,319.50 1,000,000 30
NHH1 1,000 62,851.14 200,586.96 1,000,000 72
NHH2 500 83,394.78 249,229.86 1,000,000 93
All 1,000 90,286.29 258,297.03 1,000,000 195
n￿ (millions)
LSE 37.58 207,200.45 914,013.89 5,000,005 30
NHH1 10.01 9,790.14 25,420.50 100,001 69
NHH2 10.00 38,308.57 161,763.92 1,000,001 87
All 10.01 54,969.78 384,720.27 5,000,005 186
Notes: N(LSE)=39, N(NHH1)=75, N(NHH2)=98, N(ALL)=212
￿Obs￿is the number of valid numerical responses of G and of M
Minimum reported value of G and of M was 1
Table 4: AA types. Numerical responses in scenarios 1 and 2
of two threads of comment on scenario 2: that there is a clear overall income
gain which must be desirable, whatever the value of M20 or that the loss to
the poor is vanishingly small.21 The spike would probably have been lower
if the rich person￿ s gain in scenario 2 had been lower than £100.
Recall that the reported values of G and M can be used to derive the
critical population size n￿ above which the AA-position proves problematic
in practice; for each individual respondent one simply applies the formula
(16). Figure 3 shows the distribution of the resulting n￿ for each subsample
money, and even the slightest increase of the ones who earn £ 10,000 is for the good.￿￿£ 1
is better than nothing.￿
20There were many comments along the lines of ￿Here, the social surplus larger...,￿￿this
increases the total income in the economy, which is good,￿ or ￿society earns £ 99.￿














Figure 1: AA types. Distribution of G (Scenario 1 Question 2)
of respondents and overall; the bottom part of Table 4 gives the summary
statistics for these distributions.
How large would n￿ need to be to be e⁄ectively in￿nite, so that the puzzle
becomes a practical problem? In Figure 3 the grey vertical line marks the
position on the horizontal scale of the total population of the world and it
is clear that a substantial proportion of each subsample of AA types lies
to the right of this line and that some of those observations produce values
that are hundreds of times the world population. It is also clear, from
Table 4, that the mean value of n￿ exceeds the present world population,
but that the median is a much more modest number, about 371
2 million for
the UK subsample, about 10 million for the NHH subsamples and overall.
However, we might seek other reference groups to determine how large is
￿large.￿Table 5 gives the size n of a number of possible reference groups
and the value of F(n) where F is the empirical distribution function of the
computed n￿.22 If we compare the median value of n￿ with any of these














Figure 2: AA types. Distribution of M (Scenario 2 Question 2)
reference groups we can see that for Norway (and smaller countries) there
is no problem of the two-tyrannies dilemma; for the UK and larger there is
indeed a potential problem; Belgium is, perhaps, borderline. In summary,
our analysis indicates that, for most individuals, this dilemma does not
seem to be of practical importance for local moral questions only involving
a small number of individuals. But it may be of importance for national
considerations, and most likely is relevant for moral questions related to
global and intergenerational injustice.
erational justice then a much larger reference group would be relevant. Asheim (2010)
suggests that the number of people who will potentially live in the future is 10 million
times the current world population; if this were added to Table 5 then clearly we would























Figure 3: AA types. Distribution of Critical Population Size n￿ =
100G[M + 1]
5 Responses to the questionnaire ￿the e⁄ects of
background
It is clear from the above discussion that there is considerable variability
within the combined sample in the social values implied by the questionnaire
responses. In order to understand what may drive the di⁄erent responses we
carry out some standard statistical analysis. First, in section 5.1, we look at
the factors in￿ uencing the response patterns that were described in Section
3.3; then, in section 5.2, we look at the in￿ uences on the numerical values
that determine the critical population size. Both parts of the analysis use
the following background variables:
￿ sex: equals 1 if reported male, 0 otherwise
￿ age: in years
￿ pol: self-rated political views on a seven-point scale from left (1) to
right (7)
￿ familyincome: self-rated income position of family looking back 10
years, on a seven-point scale from poor (1) to rich (7).
17n F(n)










Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social A⁄airs.2009
Table 5: AA types. Position of various reference groups in the n￿ distribu-
tion
￿ prospects: self-rated prospective income position of self looking for-
ward 10 years, coded as above.
￿ nhh1, nhh2: dummies for respondents from, respectively, the NHH1
and NHH2 subsamples.
In addition we had available two more variables related to the way in
which the questionnaire session was run. To control for the possibility that
the ordering of the ￿rst two scenarios might a⁄ect how people respond on
the tyranny questions, half of the questionnaires presented scenarios 1 and 2
in reverse order. Also the order of ￿nishing the questionnaires was preserved
so that we have an ordinal indicator of the time that the respondents spent
in completing the questionnaire.
￿ version: equals 1 if scenarios 1 and 2 were in the reverse order, 0
otherwise.
￿ pos: position of the observation in the sample; the smaller the number
the longer the respondent had taken to complete the questionnaire.
5.1 Patterns of response
To investigate the determinants of particular patterns of response we estim-
ate a standard probit model
￿ = ￿(b1x1 + b2x2 + ::: + bnxn) (17)
18where ￿ is the probability of a particular response pattern, ￿ is the normal
distribution function, (b1;:::;bn) is a vector of coe¢ cients and (x1;:::;xn) is
a vector of characteristics. As a robustness check we applied this model both
in an untransformed version ￿where the xs are simply the raw values of the
variables described above ￿and a transformed version ￿where the explanat-
ory variables familyincome and prospects are replaced by exp(familyincome)
and exp(prospects).23
From the probit regression model some clear conclusions can be drawn
about the characteristics that seem to predispose people to a particular re-
sponse patterns. First consider the ￿basic￿distributional principles, respect
for Progressive Transfers and for Replication, where ￿ in (17) means ￿prob-
ability that response conforms to the principle.￿Table 6 shows that being
female or being more right wing means that you are more likely to respond
in a manner contrary to the principle of progressive transfers (see the results
from scenario 3): the female e⁄ect is in line with ￿ndings in other contexts
(Amiel and Cowell 2002, 2007). Being female means that you are also more
likely to reject Replication (see the results from scenario 4). The conclusions
remain unchanged if we use the transformed version of the model; it is also
clear that the other personal characteristics, version of the questionnaire,
the length of time the person took over the responses and the subsample
dummies play no role.
Now let us examine the responses to the ￿tyranny￿questions ￿scenarios
1 and 2. Table 7 presents the outcome of applying the model (17) to the
cases where ￿ = Pr(pattern k) where k = AA, AB or BA; in each case
we present the results for the standard list of explanatory variables and for
an augmented model which incorporates the role of ￿Progressive Transfers￿
and ￿Replication attitudes￿as possible determinants of responses to the ￿rst
two scenarios. If the subject respects Progressive Transfers or Replication
then he is more likely to respond A in scenario 1 (in the case of Progress-
ive Transfers this is to be expected). As far as the four types in Table 1
are concerned, respecting Progressive Transfers increases the probability of
being of type AB; violation of Replication reduces the probability that the
person responds AA.24 Once again political views and sex of the respondent
are important: more right-wing political views increase the probability of a
type BA response (not concerned about mob tyranny, concerned about in-
dividual tyranny) and decrease the probability of a type AB response; males
23We used this transformation because, instead of data recorded in monetary units
(where it is common to take a log transformation), our data are on a scale of 1 to 7.
24It also increases the probability that the person responds BB.
19Progressive Transfers Replication
untransformed transformed untransformed transformed
version -0.0202 -0.0092 -0.0100 -0.0009
(-0.20) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.01)
pos 0.0412 0.0498 -0.0408 -0.0199
(0.23) (0.28) (-0.21) (-0.10)
nhh1 0.0719 0.0457 0.0433 0.0310
(0.46) (0.30) (0.27) (0.19)
nhh2 0.1502 0.1306 -0.2211 -0.2328
(0.98) (0.86) (-1.35) (-1.43)
sex 0.1894￿ 0.2028￿ 0.1907 0.2163￿
(1.77) (1.90) (1.64) (1.87)
age -0.0027 -0.0013 -0.0115 -0.0071
(-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.43) (-0.27)
politicalviews -0.2156￿￿￿ -0.2158￿￿￿ -0.0743 -0.0689
(-4.55) (-4.54) (-1.48) (-1.37)
familyincome -0.0411 0.0000 -0.0273 -0.0001
(-0.77) (0.00) (-0.48) (-0.34)
prospects -0.0043 -0.0002 0.1154 0.0002
(-0.06) (-0.68) (1.51) (0.92)
_cons 1.0210 0.8231 -0.5064 -0.2053
(1.52) (1.48) (-0.69) (-0.34)
Table 6: Probit Results for Scenario 3 (Progressive Transfers) and Scenario
4 (Replication)
are more likely to have a BA type of response pattern and less likely to be of
AB type. Finally note that there is an ordering e⁄ect ￿putting scenario 2
￿rst reduces the probability of an AB response and increases the probability
of a BA response.
5.2 Reported thresholds ￿e⁄ects of background
We may also investigate the e⁄ect of background variables on the threshold
income G (scenario 1, question 2) and the threshold number M (scenario
2, question 2). The principal results are summarised in Table 8. This
reports the results of a simple log-linear regression of the log of the value
reported ￿log(s1q2) and log(s2q2) ￿against the personal characteristics for
20Type AA Type AB Type BA
version 0.0689 0.0672 -0.2326￿￿ -0.2457￿￿ 0.2026￿ 0.2287￿
(-1.01) (0.62) (-2.14) (-2.19) (1.70) (1.87)
pos 0.2244 0.2405 -0.0112 -0.0497 -0.0508 -0.0490
(1.23) (1.29) (-0.06) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.23)
nhh1 -0.0174 -0.0405 0.2463 0.1957 -0.0159 0.0673
(-0.11) (-0.26) (1.50) (1.17) (-0.09) (0.37)
nhh2 -0.0165 -0.0089 0.2571 0.1645 -0.0044 0.0778
(-0.11) (-0.06) (1.58) (0.98) (-0.02) (0.42)
sex 0.1319 0.0935 -0.1849￿ -0.2124￿ 0.1694 0.1993
(1.21) (0.83) (-1.66) (-1.84) (1.36) (1.55)
age -0.0030 -0.0028 0.0147 0.0174 -0.0354 -0.0437
(-0.12) (-0.11) (0.59) (0.70) (-1.05) (-1.26)
politicalviews 0.0434 0.0594 -0.1428￿￿￿ -0.1283￿￿ 0.1070￿ 0.1126￿
(0.91) (1.19) (-2.92) (-2.50) (1.94) (1.94)
familyincome -0.0535 -0.0586 -0.0258 -0.0021 0.0360 0.0026
(-0.98) (-1.06) (-0.45) (-0.04) (0.59) (0.04)
prospects 0.0346 0.0085 -0.0875 -0.0905 0.0413 0.0341
(0.49) (0.12) (-1.17) (-1.18) (0.52) (0.42)
progressivetransfers 0.0039 0.2504￿￿ -0.1160
(0.04) (2.19) (-0.94)
replication 0.3279￿￿￿ 0.0740 -0.2176
(2.74) (0.59) (-1.52)
_cons -0.6972 -0.6709 0.3845 0.1055 -1.1975 -0.8335
(-1.01) (-0.95) (0.55) (0.15) (-1.40) (-0.94)
Table 7: Probit Results for Question 1 by types
the subsample of respondents who provided a non-null response to question
2 in each scenario. Once again we do this for the basic set of explanatory
variables and for the augmented model where we also use the responses to
scenarios 3 and 4 as explanatory variables.25
25As robustness checks we also did the following. (a) We tried using exp(familyincome)
and exp(prospects) as explanatory variables rather than their untransformed counterparts
￿ again this change in speci￿cation had no e⁄ect. (b) Using the same subsample of
respondents we tried a simple linear regression of s1q2 and s2q2: in this case only nhh1
was signi￿cant (in the s1q2 equation). (c) We also ran the equations on the full sample
applying a Heckman regression to allow for non-response on question 2 where the person
gave response B rather than A in question 1. This led to a set of coe¢ cient estimates and
P-values that were very similar to those reported in the simple regression of Table 8.
21log(s1q2) log(s2q2)
version -0.6750￿￿ -0.6166￿ 1.9204￿￿￿ 2.1633￿￿￿
(-2.04) (-1.81) (3.74) (4.17)
pos -0.0461 0.1041 -0.1204 0.0339
(-0.08) (0.18) (-0.13) (0.04)
nhh1 -1.0029￿ -0.9830￿ 0.7365 0.8753
(-1.93) (-1.88) (0.90) (1.07)
nhh2 -1.2340￿￿ -1.2929￿￿ -0.1073 -0.0535
(-2.40) (-2.46) (-0.13) (-0.07)
sex -0.6091￿ -0.5889￿ -2.2660￿￿￿ -2.3302￿￿￿
(-1.79) (-1.67) (-4.18) (-4.18)
age 0.0769 0.0829 0.0606 0.0758
(0.94) (1.00) (0.40) (0.50)
politicalviews 0.4323￿￿￿ 0.4162￿￿￿ -0.0443 -0.0591
(2.88) (2.66) (-0.19) (-0.24)
familyincome -0.4008￿￿ -0.4117￿￿ 0.1919 0.1847
(-2.15) (-2.17) (0.72) (0.69)
prospects 0.2398 0.1347 -0.6647￿￿ -0.7872￿￿





_cons 4.5041￿ 4.9465￿￿ 7.6591￿￿ 7.1676￿
(1.90) (2.00) (2.00) (1.86)
Table 8: Regression Results for Question 2
22For these numerical values income now plays a role, along with sex and
political views; but the views on scenarios 3 and 4 play no role. Higher family
income appears to make people ￿more generous￿in that it is associated with
a lower value of G, although it has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on M. By contrast
higher income prospects have no signi￿cant e⁄ect on G, but are associated
with a lower value of M (it makes people ￿less generous￿ ). If the respondent
is male this is likely to lower the value of G and of M.26 However, if we
were to regress critical population (the value of n￿ computed from G and M)
against the same sets of explanatory variables then sex, then the background
variables are not signi￿cant. In other words sex, political views and the
income variables explain G and M separately, but they do not explain their
product; this makes sense because G and M more or less vary inversely over
the whole sample.
6 Conclusion
We might have guessed that students are against tyranny. However, it is
interesting that for the student respondents in our questionnaire experi-
ment there was both a majority against individual tyranny and a majority
against mob tyranny Indeed, in the four categories of possible responses
in our ￿tyranny￿ scenarios, the ￿Anti-Anti￿ case is a clear winner. This
fact is in the context of mainly coherent views from our respondents on all
four principles (the two tyrannies plus progressive transfers and replication),
backed by a large number of comments explaining the reasoning.
Whether there is a dilemma facing Anti-Anti people in practice depends
on the size of the population under consideration, as we explained in section
2: think of this as the potential size of a reference group. We can compute
the required critical size from the questionnaire responses and it is not ne-
cessarily astronomical: the reference group does not need to be all that large
to present a problem. To summarise roughly, three quarters of our respond-
ents would face a dilemma if the reference group were as huge as China; but
(more surprisingly perhaps) about a quarter of our respondents would still
face a dilemma if the reference group were as tiny as Luxembourg.
It makes sense that the respondent￿ s background family income and ex-
pected future income may play a role in determining the critical numbers
26Respondents in the NHH1 subsample are likely to report a lower value of G and those
in NHH2 are likely to report a higher value of M; once again there is an ordering e⁄ect
in that the scenario that is presented ￿rst elicits the higher numerical response.
23that we ask our respondents to provide. Political views and the respond-
ent￿ s sex also play a role in in￿ uencing these numbers and they in￿ uence the
response categories themselves. Right-wingers and men are more willing to
tolerate mob tyranny and less willing to tolerate individual tyranny ￿should
we be surprised?
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24A Appendix
The following is the standard version of the questionnaire used in this study.
About half of the respondents received an alternate version that presented







Ethical views on the distribution of income 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. We are interested in your opinion on ethical issues 
related to the distribution of income in society. Your response will be most important for our 
research project, so we ask you carefully to consider the questions that we pose below. We are 
not looking for the “right” answers to the questions, so please feel free to express your views on 
these issues. The questionnaire is anonymous, so we will not at any point ask you to reveal your 
identity.  
 
The questions are stated with reference to a society where the average annual income of an 
individual is £20,000 and the lowest annual income is £10,000, and where all individuals work 
equally hard and have the same needs. In this society, an annual income of £10,000 ensures a 
living standard slightly above the subsistence level, whereas an annual income of £20,000 
ensures a decent living standard. In each of the scenarios we ask you to consider, there is an 
unforeseen event which happens this year. Its effects on people’s living standards are limited to 
this year only and differ across income groups. So this means that in all the following years 
everybody’s living standard are unaffected by this event. 
 
Please note that this is not a test of logic. Each of the questions is a “stand alone”, so it can be 
answered independently of any of the other questions.   
 
Scenario 1: 
o  everyone with income over £50,000 experiences a £1 reduction in income; 
o  one person with income of £10,000 experiences an increase in income; 
o  no-one else is affected. 
 
▪ Which of the following views do you agree with? 
  A: “if the gain for the person with £10,000 is sufficiently large, this 
is a good thing no matter how many people have incomes over 
£50,000” 
 
  B: “even if the person with £10,000 gains a huge amount, this is not 
a good thing if there are very many people with incomes over 
£50,000” 
 
    
▪ If you selected A, how large must the gain be for the person with £10,000 to ensure 
that this is a good thing? 














o  one person with income of £10,000 experiences a £1 reduction in income; 
o  all persons with income over £50,000 experience a £100 increase in income;  
o  no-one else is affected. 
 
▪ Which of the following views do you agree with? 
  A: “if the number of  persons with income over £50,000 is 
sufficiently large, this is a good thing” 
 
  B: “even if the number of  persons with income over £50,000 is very 
large, this is not a good thing”  
 
    
▪ If you selected A, how many people must have an income over £50,000 to ensure 
that this is a good thing? 
 















o  one person with income of £10,000 experiences an increase in income; 
o  one person with income of £50,000 experiences a corresponding decrease of exactly the 
same amount;  
o  no-one else is affected. 
 
▪ Which of the following views do you agree with? 
  A: “this is a good thing, as long as the person who starts out with 
£10,000 does not end up richer than the person who starts out with 
£50,000” 
 
  B: “even if the person who starts out with £10,000 does not end up 
richer than the person who starts out with £50,000, this is not 
necessarily a good thing” 
 
    














o  everyone with income of £10,000 experience an increase in income; 
o  everyone with income of £50,000 experience a decrease in income; 
o  no-one else is affected. 
 
▪ Which of the following views do you agree with? 
  A: “if this were a good thing, then it would also be a good thing if 
the number of persons at all income levels in society were doubled 
(i.e., a doubling of the number of persons with  £10,000, £50,000, 
and so on)” 
 
  B: “even if this were a good thing, it would not necessarily be a 
good thing if the number of persons at all income levels in society 
were doubled (i.e., a doubling of the number of persons with  
£10,000, £50,000, and so on)” 
 
    







•  What is your age?    _____ years 
•  What is your gender?  Male   Female 
•  Are you a student?  Y   N 
•  (For students) What is your field?  __________ 
•  (For employed non-students) What is your profession?   __________ 
   
“left”  “right”  •  How would you rate your political views? Please 
put a √ on this scale. 
   
“poor”  “rich” •  “How would you rate your family's income ten 
years ago (relative to average income in the 
country where you lived then)?” 
   
“poor”  “rich” •  “How would you rate your own income prospects 
ten years from now (relative to average income in 
the country where you plan to live)?” 
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